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I. INTRODUCTION

Some time ago I attended a public lecture by South African artist
William Kentridge, which he titled "In celebration of doubt, against
reason."' In his address he focused on art as interpretation, on art as a way
of meeting the world halfway. I found his themes suggestive for my own
reflection on law and legal transformation - of how all attempts of
reconstruction could never exceed a meeting of the world halfway, how
approaches confidently rooted in reason are much too limited to achieve
transformative politics and ideals fully.
This Article encompasses three related moments. Firstly, I consider the
limits of the law, particularly transformative legal attempts. I highlight
some features of these transformative legal attempts. I recall a number of
critical responses to the emphasis placed on law and human rights in the
creation of a new society as well as some contemplations on the limits of
the law to fully address an unjust past and equality fully. Secondly, I turn

* Karin van Marle, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria.
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to one legislative attempt to redress past inequality in South Africa, the
South African Employment Equity Act, and consider a problematic
interpretation and misuse of the term "designated group" as defined in the
act. 2 I also include Duncan Kennedy's discussion of what he calls "colour
blind meritocratic fundamentalism" and argue that this mindset is also
found in South African legal academia.3 Thirdly, I look at how aesthetic
portrayals could assist in contemplating the paradoxes of past and present,
traditional and transgressive encountered in any process of transformation.
After discussing these aesthetic portrayals, I recall an argument against
incorporationism: how the mainstream, or patriarchy, would protect its
pervasive power by including only those outsiders who would continue
things as they are without challenge or subversion. I turn to aesthetic
images also to continue my reflection on transformation. These images
assist me in contemplating cases where the nature of the discrimination is
difficult to pinpoint - where the particularity reaches beyond sex, race,
or class and also involves more subtle aspects. I make a few tentative
remarks by way of conclusion.
The main contentions that I put forward amount to the following: the
first is a repetition of the limits of the law argument, but also of law's
paradox - its aim to transform that is hampered by its structural limits, its
structural limits constantly challenged by its own transformative aims. The
second and third contentions follow from the first and are somewhat more
tentative. I argue that a limited reading of the South African Employment
Equity Act that avoids taking past and present context into account would
result in a mere continuance of the status quo. Following from that I
contend that any act of transformation must take particularityinto account,
and that it is precisely that kind of particularity that is mostly violated by
legal categories and consciously negated and excluded by institutions
reinforcing present politics and ideology.

II. POLITICAL AND LEGAL TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

A. Substantive Change, Beyond Formal Change
Mainstream discourse on the South African political, legal and social
transformation describes our transformation as a shift that aims to go
beyond mere formal changes and to encompass substantive changes. Many
writers have described the South African constitution as moving beyond
2. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
3.

§ 1(e).

DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS OF

CULTURAL IDENTITY 34 (1993).
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typical liberal constitutions. The South African constitution has been
described as postliberal, postauthoritarian, and transformative. 4 Karl Klare
lists the following features as indications of the South African
constitution's "postliberal" or "engaged" nature: it entrenches social rights

and duties and a substantive conception of equality; it imposes a range of
affirmative as opposed to negative state duties; it allows for the horizontal
application of constitutional duties; it envisions participatory governance;
it protects and advances multiculturalism; and it is historically self-

conscious.5
It is widely agreed that the protection of equality and prevention of

discrimination in section 9 of the South African Constitution also entails
more than mere formal equality and protects substantive equality.6 Such
an approach requires material and concrete contexts to be taken into
account in determining legal equality challenges. Section 9(2) of the
Constitution makes explicit a provision for the creation of legislative and
other measures to promote the achievement of equality for persons or

categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. In light of
section 9(2), the Employment Equity Act was promulgated as one such
measure to promote the achievement of substantive equality. The argument

that I elaborate on below holds that the Employment Equity Act must be
interpreted and applied in light of the substantive aim of the South African
political and legal transformation.
B. Critique on Legal Fetishism
Arguments that play a critical role in this contemplation are those

bringing attention to the limits of the law and human rights in the
transformation of societies. Richard Wilson, in a work that focuses on the

South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), focuses on
the kind of "procedural liberalism" that dominated most transitions from
authoritarian to post-authoritarian societies.' Human rights based
legislation became a central component in the establishment of the rule of

law. The author stands critical towards the fact that in these
transformations human rights are detached from their "strictly legal
foundations" and become a "generalized moral and political discourse."'
4. Karl Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM.
RIGHTS 146 (1998); Henk Botha, Democracy and Rights: Constitutional Interpretation in a
Postrealist World, 63 TYDSKRIF VIR DIE HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS HOLLANDSE REG 561 (2000).

5. Klare, supra note 4, at 153-55.
6. S. AFR. CONST. Act 108.
7. RICHARD WILSON,.THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

(2001).
8. Id. at xv.
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He quite correctly exposes how justice in transition serves projects of
hegemonic nation-building and state formation and draws attention to how
new regimes use human rights to "re-imagine the nation by constructing
new official histories."9 His argument critiques the abstract nature of
transitional truth and justice and supports an examining of how these
notions of truth and justice are central to state strategies for creating a new
hegemony. A crucial point of his critique occurs when he draws attention
to the construction of "the present moment as post-authoritarian when it
includes many elements of the past."10
Wilson's reflections on the TRC, that highlight as main functions of the
TRC truth-telling about the apartheid past and the reconciliation of the
nation, give significant insight into the relationship between the past,
present, and future and the limited role of the law. The author argues that
the TRC's account of the past was constrained by its excessive legalism
and positivist methodology, which obstructed the writing of a coherent
sociopolitical history of apartheid. He categorizes the various local
responses to the TRC's language of reconciliation as follows: adductive
affinities (where local values and human rights overlap and reinforce one
another); pragmatic proceduralism (where survivors participate in human
rights procedures to pursue their own agendas, without necessarily taking
on human rights values); and relational discontinuities (where local actors
are resistant to a restorative vision of human rights and assert a more
retributive model of justice). A main aim of his argument is to show that
human rights institutions and discourse in the "new" South Africa often
have been flawed in connecting local minorities and justice institutions and
ultimately in transforming society."
Wilson views the South African transition as another example of the
triumph of liberalism leading to the demise of socialist ideologies and the
rise of laissez faire economics similar to the transition in Central and
Eastern Europe. He is of the opinion that human rights are best
conceptualized as narrow legal instruments, which protect frail individuals
from powerful state and societal institutions. Human rights can play a vital
role in establishing accountability and the rule of law. However, it is
wrong to "fetishize rights and treat them as a full-blown political and
ethical philosophy."" The author draws our attention to the limits of the
law and repeats the argument made also by others that the law and the
legal system is too narrow to contain our aspirations for politics and
community.
9. Id. at xvi.

10. Id.
11. Id. at xxi.
12. WILSON, supranote 7, at 224.
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Emilios Christodoulidis raises similar arguments in his critique on what
he calls "the suspect intimacies" between law, politics, citizenship, and
community." He questions the ability of the law and the desirability of
wanting the law to be the vessel for political contestation, social change,
and the negotiation of the past. In response to the South African TRC he
question law's (and thus a legal structure's) ability to reconcile, to give
mercy.'"
He locates mercy in the space between law (law's justice) and
particularity. The crux of the mercy/justice distinction lies in the notion of
concrete particularity.15 To reduce the complexity of his argument, the
main claim that he makes that is relevant to my argument here is that
particularity in law is "abstracted, more-or-less fixed and reduced to role

and rule."'6
He explains this reduction with reference to Joseph Razz's notion of
exclusionary reason." Razz makes a distinction between first-order and
second-order reasons. The former are reasons to perform an act, the latter
are reasons to act for a reason. Second order reasons may be positive or
negative. Razz names negative secondary reasons exclusionary - "an
exclusionary reason provides a reason for not acting on the basis of a
reason."' 8
What this amounts to is that in exclusionary reasons like legal rules and
legal systems "balancing of first-order reasons is blocked: an exclusionary
reason stands in for the back-ground arguments that justify it, and
moreover prevents recourse to those arguments."'9 In other words, law and
legal rules prevent reflexivity and revisability and are based on a
generality that precludes particularity: "Law generalizes expectations so
that interaction, conflict, contestation, negotiation, etc., will be
accommodated at the level of what is expected of one institutionally."2 0
Law will always reduce the complexity of the particular.
Drucilla Cornell, in her call for the protection of the imaginary domain,
also acknowledges the limits of the law to fully ensure equality, freedom,

13. Emilios A. Christodouilidis, The Suspect Intimacy Between Law and Political
Community, 1 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS- UND SOZIAL PHILOSOPHIE (1994).
14. Emilios A. Christodoulidis, The IrrationalityofMercifulLegalJudgement: Exclusionary
Reasoning and the Question of the Particular, 18 L. & PHIL. 215-41 (1999).

15. Id. at 218.
16. Id. at 225.
17. JOSEPH RAzz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975).

18. Id at 225.
19. Id. at 225-26.
20. Id. at 235.
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and, in particular, dignity.2 ' Central to her ethical feminism is the notion
of difference that must be acknowledged. However, she argues for a nonessentialist starting point and seeks new ways of articulating "the feminine
within sexual difference."" Cornell's insights are crucial to my argument,
because of her careful consideration of the person. Integral to her concept
of the imaginary domain is that a person is always part of a project of
becoming. A person is thus understood as a possibility, an aspiration.
Through the development of a psychoanalytical framework, Cornell
argues that the freedom to become a person is dependent on minimum
conditions of individuation that serve as a prior set of conditions. In other
words, the freedom that a person must have to become a person demands

the appropriate space for renewing the imagination and re-imagining "who
one is and who one seeks to become."" The importance of this for my
argument is that although formal equality and other legislative protections
have achieved some gains, most societies still continue to impose and
reinforce rigid gender identities upon their citizens. Cornell demands

recognition of the moral space necessary for equivalent evaluation of
women's sexual difference as free and equal persons." The demand for the
imaginary domain must be met prior to the formulation of a broader
egalitarian and social justice theory.
In an earlier work Cornell provides an explanation of transformation
that I find suggestive for the kind of transformation that I think we should
strive for:
By transformation I mean change radical enough to so dramatically
restructure any system -

political, legal, or social -

that the

"identity" of the system is itself altered. The second meaning,
defined broadly as possible, turns to the question of what kind of
individuals we would have to become in order to open ourselves to
new worlds.
If the change encompasses nothing more than the transformation of the
system by the system, the change amounts to evolution in contrast to

transformation as defined above. The crucial question, however, coming
21. See DRUCILLA CORNELL, BETWEEN WOMEN AND GENERATIONS: LEGACIES OF DIGNITY

(2000).
22. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION (1991); DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE
IMAGINARY DOMAIN. ABORTION, PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1995); DRUCILLA
CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM (1998).
23. CORNELL, THE IMAGINARY DOMAIN, supra note 22, at 5.
24. CORNELL, AT THE HEART OF FREEDOM, supra note 22, at 11-14.
25. DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS 1 (1993).
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back to Christodoulidis, is if law as a system can experience the radical
transformation that Cornell defines?
In present South Africa, there are many legal attempts to bring about
much needed political and social transformation. Amongst many others, 2 6
the Promotion of Equality and Unfair Discrimination Act and the
Employment Equity Act are examples. 27 Of course these legal attempts
have had some success but at the same time they also continue oppression
instead of breaking with the past. Examples of this are reform efforts in
terms of which existing leasehold rights of township residents are
transformed to full property rights. These reforms have benefitted black
South Africans generally, because they acquire property rights to their
homes. However, the benefits have accrued mostly to black men and not
black women because the underlying leasehold rights were mostly in the
hands of men. This is an example of only a superficial engagement with
the past and no real negotiation of the past, of evolution and not radical

transformation.
III. EMPLOYMENT EQUITY

A. DesignatedGroup
This Article is to a large extent an outcome of frustrations that I have
with the promotion and application of employment equity in my own law
school but I could add many South African faculties of law or law
schools. 28 My contention is that in many appointments the aims and
objectives of employment equity are evaded. Although I focus here on the
neglect to promote employment equity my concern goes further than

employment equity and are elaborated on in the next section.
The reflections on the limits of the law and its inability to sufficiently
address political transformation and a creative and reflective negotiation
with the past are central to my deliberation on employment equity in South
Africa. The obvious and trite point is that, to achieve real transformation,

&

26. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.
27. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.
28. It must be noted that in a few cases where labor courts had to decide on the interpretation
of a "designated group," the labor court took South African political history into account. See
Salstaff on Behalf of Strydom & Spoomet (2002) 23 I.L.J. 25 (ARB); POPCRU on Behalf of
KUKKUK v. SA Police Servs. (2001) 22 I.L.J. 2096; Coetzer & Others v. Minister of Safety
Sec. & Another (2003)24 I.L.J. 163 (LC); Kruger v. SA Police Servs. (2003) 24 I.L.J. 477 (BCA);
SA Police Union on Behalf of Venter & SA Police Servs. (2002) 23 I.L.J. 454 (BCA); see also
Allan Rycroft, Obstacles to Employment Equity, 13 INDUS. L.J. 2102 (2001).
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representation and diversity more than mere legal attempts will be
necessary. As was also argued above, the law can in some cases affirm the
status quo instead of making a change. And even more dangerously, it can
create the impression of post-authoritarianism while continuing past
attitudes.
I focus on the definition of designated groups in the Employment
Equity Act, and in particularon how in some cases the definition is applied
to continue aformal notion of equality in contrast to substantive equality
thereby repeating the same mistakes of the past. The Employment Equity
Act defines "designated groups" as "black people, women and people with
disabilities." The definition is obviously important, because only members
of "designated groups" stand to benefit from employment equity efforts in
terms of the Act.
In some cases this definition is used very crudely as justification for the
appointment of white women instead of black women and men, thereby
resisting real transformation. In other words, institutions appoint white
women under the guise of complying with the employment equity
legislation while in fact they are addressing neither the aim of equitable
representation nor the aim of diversity. Institutions do this to evade the
racial integration that would follow from appointing black people and to
continue the status quo of a primarily white staff, whilst pretending to
transform.
My contention is that this happens not only because of conservatism
and racism but also because of the firm belief that white women, or at least
those that are appointed, will be easier to contain, that they would leave
the present culture unchallenged and unchanged. This attitude could also
be prevalent when appointing black people, in the sense that only'those
who would "fit the profile" of the institution would be appointed. I
elaborate on this below in my discussion of the aesthetic portrayals.
To return specifically to the interpretation of "designated group" in the
employment equity legislation: I argue against a reading and application
of "designated group" that treats black women and white women in an
equal manner, ignoring concrete past and present contexts. For me this is
a cynical continuation of legal formalism that negates not only substantive
equality but also the general aim of employment equity - equitable
representation. It also contradicts the approach of purposive interpretation.
This approach could be linked with universalist and essentialist
feminisms that claim transparency by assuming that "the world can be
seen as it really is and that there can be unmediated access to the truth of
objects it sees."2 9 In contrast to these universalist and essentialist positions
29. ALISON BLUNT & GILLIAN ROSE, WRITING WOMEN AND SPACE: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL GEOGRAPHIES 5

(1994).
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is an approach that focuses on what Adrienne Rich calls a "politics of
location" takes concrete historical and materialist positions into account
and rejects transparency. 30 "Multiple locations" are opened where identity
is perceived as "fragmented, multidimensional, contradictory and
provisional." 3 ' Haraway refers to such a concept of identity as a
"geometrics of difference and contradiction" that rejects a portrayal of
identity and the self as stable and coherent.3 2
B. ColorblindMeritocraticFundamentalism
Duncan Kennedy bases his argument for affirmative action in legal
academia on the ground that law schools are political institutions. From a
democratic point of view people should be represented in institutions of
power. He also contends that affirmative action and greater cultural
diversity would increase the value of legal scholarship. Kennedy employs
the concept of "race-consciousness" - to talk about race without being
racist or essentialist and to think of groups in a "postmodern" way that
acknowledges the "partial, unstable and contradictory character of group
existence."3 3
For Kennedy, the dominant way of understanding race and merit in
academia amounts to what he calls, "colour-blind meritocratic
fundamentalism." I believe this term also to be quite fitting for dominant
understandings of employment equity in South African legal academia. He
describes it as "a set of ideas about race and merit" that is "no more than
one of many fragments out of which people construct their personal
philosophies."" Fundamentalism comprises a set of tenets, some about
knowledge and others about the social value of individuals and their work.
A key aspect of fundamentalism is colorblindness. Fundamentalism does
not preclude the adoption of affirmative action programs but regards it to
be in conflict with merit and as a form of sacrifice, social cost or loss.
Political and cultural arguments for affirmative action would argue
against the view of affirmative action as "peacemaking," "reparation" or
"integration for its own sake." 35 Political and cultural arguments are based
on the idea that there should be "a substantial representation of all
numerically significant minority communities on American law faculties"
and that "cultural diversity and cultural development are good in
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 34.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 40.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

9

660

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 9

[Vol. 16

themselves." 36 Equitable representation and diversity are set up as aims in
the South African employment equity legislation, but unfortunately those

aims are time and again defeated by so-called appointments made on
merit.
Kennedy formulates the "conceptual theme," "if there is one," of his

essay as one of"positionality" or "situatedness" and explains it as follows:
The individual in his or her culture, the individual as a practitioner
of an ideology, the individual in relation to his or her own neurotic
structures is always somewhere, has always just been somewhere

else, and is empowered and limited by being in that spot on the way
from some other spot. Communities are like that too, though in a
complicated way. One of the things that define a community's
position - its situation and the specific possibilities that go with it
- is its history of collective accomplishment. Another is its history
of crimes against humanity. It seems unlikely that there are

communities without such histories."
Kennedy names slavery as a crime in the past of white America.

Similarly, apartheid is a crime in the past of white South Africa. His
proposal of "a kind of cultural proportional representation in the exercise
of ideological power" should be followed within the South African
context. However he warns against the limits of legal attempts to bring

about such change:
[T]he minute we imagine it as a government policy applied in a
consistent way across the whole range of situations to which it is

arguably applicable, it loses most of its appeal. First, none of us
local powerholders could do much to bring it about, and second,
taking the proposal seriously as state policy might lead to all kinds
of disastrous unintended side-effects.38
IV. AESTHETIC PORTRAYALS

My reflection on the transformation of South African society and my
critique on the legal fetishism preoccupying this transformation is situated
against the backdrop of an aesthetic context - against the tension between

traditional representations of women and transgressive and subversive
36. Id at 41.
37. Id at 80-81.
38. KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 81.
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ones: the traditional portrayal of the blinded justitia compared to South

African artist, Braam Kruger's, black, naked, seeing justitia; Dutch
sculptor Anton van Wouw's portrayal of the Afrikaaner "maiden," long

dress, "kappie," head on the chest, compared to contemporary South
African sculptor, Angus Taylor's armed, naked maiden. 39 My aim is to

remember and imagine these images when contemplating ideas like unfair
discrimination and substantive equality.
Although white women also suffered and were marginalized under the
patriarchal system of apartheid, their position cannot be placed on par with

black women. As Froneman J. said in a Labor Court of Appeal case, in
present South Africa the issue is not whether some are more equal than
others after the revolution, but that some were more unequal than others
before.40 More than that, present attempts of 'incorporationism' must also

be noted -

the mainstream accept and draw in women who they think will

fit the profile and who will continue the status quo without questioning.
The aesthetic portrayals of women could assist us in our critical
reflections on these transformative attempts. The contemporary
transgressive images portray a fragmented, multidimensional,
contradictory and provisional self in contrast to the traditional portrayals.
To truly break with past formalist approaches and create a society where
not only materialist differences, but fluid identities are supported, the past,
present and future should be investigated in a critical manner, moving
beyond universalist and essentialist claims.
In a volume on Law and Aesthetics edited by Costas Douzinas and
Lynda Nead, Martin Jay tells us that the eyes of the goddess Justitia were
not always covered and that it was only at the end of the fifteenth century

that a blindfold was placed over the goddess's eyes. 4' The initial negative
implication of the blindfold, that "Justice has been robbed of her ability to
get things straight" 42 was by 1530 transformed into a positive emblem of
impartiality and equality before the law. Jay makes a connection between

39. "Kappie" is an Afrikaans word that translates literally to "bonnet." It refers to the quite
elaborate headdress worn by women during the "Groot Trek," the great migration of white farmers
from the Cape into the interior of South Africa that took place during the first half of the nineteenth
century. The "kappie" and long dress worn by these "Voortrekker" women, covering them literally
from head to toe, are powerful symbols of the traditional Afrikaaner ideal of womanhood: strong,
yet appropriately modest and in the background.
40. Dep't of Corr. Servs. v. Van Vuuren (1999) 20 I.L.J. 2297 (LAC).
41. Martin Jay, Must Justicebe Blind? The Challengeof Images to the Law, in LAW AND THE
IMAGE; THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE AESTHETICS OF LAW

19 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda

Nead

eds., 1999).
42. Id. at 20.
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the blindfold of Justitia, and Reformation thought that made much of
Augustine's notion of resisting the "lust of the eyes."43
The author notes the connection between the impartiality portrayed by
the blindfolded Justitia and the new urban, secular bourgeois culture ofthe
early modern period. During this period a shift took place from the
personalism of private, feudal justice, and the foundations of modern
liberal thought were laid, "the road to the modern cult of the abstract norm
in juridical positivism was opened."4 The law was to be presented in
language, and justice was to be achieved by applying general rules and
norms. Jay refers to Horkheimer and Adorno who associated the ability to
see with freedom, "a freedom that is threatened when justice is reduced to
law." 45 He interprets this freedom as the ability of the particular, the
unique, the incommensurable to escape law's universalism and the
reduction of justice to the law of equivalents. 4 6
Another important feature of the thwarting of the gaze is that it is a
thwarting of specifically the female gaze. The author notes how the stern
portrayals of justitia differ from the maternal images of the forgiving,
mediating Madonna for example. A question that arises is why should a
female judge in particular be prevented from seeing. The author interprets
this with reference to work done by Carol Gilligan, Seyla Benhaib and
others, claiming that women account for morality in a different manner,
according to an ethics of care, that takes into account the concrete other in
contrast to an ethics ofjustice that focuses only on the generalizedother.4 7
In other words, the female gaze must be thwarted in the service of
formalist and positivist accounts of justice. The blindfolded Justitia thus
must be interpreted as a symbol of male power.
I want us to consider the transgressive power of the black seeing
Justitia that appeared on a poster announcing the first conference on
human rights organized by the University of Pretoria Centre for Human
Rights during the late eighties. In this painting the artist places a woman
in the position of Justitia that, in the context of apartheid South Africa, is
not only black, but is also a woman that sees, that challenges formalist and
positivist accounts of justice, and that disrupts law's universalism by
forcing the viewer to acknowledge her particularity. It is this particularity
that needs to be taken into account when applying the Employment Equity
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 21.
Id at 25.
Id.
Jay, supra note 41, at 26.
47. Id. at 27-29; see generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER,
COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY (1992).
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Act, by giving an interpretation and application of "designated group" that
takes the concrete historical and present contexts into account and not a
mere formalist interpretation that ignores the past in favor of protecting the
status quo.
To reinforce my argument on the status quo that must be challenged I
refer to the statues of South African sculptor Angus Taylor. Taylor works
in the tradition of Dutch sculptor Anton van Wouw, portraying women in
heavy bronze sculptures. However, Taylor's women differ significantly
from the previous portrayals that aimed to enforce the stereotypical image
of the Afrikaaner "maiden." 48 Taylor has been described as exploring "a
culture in transition: in particular the ending of the forcibly imposed
Afrikaaner hegemony, and the liberation of women.""
His work has interesting cross-cultural themes. For example, one statue
shows a Voortrekker woman holding a "assegaai," which is a traditional
African weapon. The notion of "trace" is represented by certain symbols
and objects that keep on recurring in all the works. In one work we see a
nude Voortrekker woman sitting on an object that also appears in the other
works, something that the artist refers to as "Pandora's box," as
representing anything one wants it to be, holding a flying object above her
head and as one commentator notes, considering to fly.50 The baggage,
which is referred to in the title of the exhibition, is represented by symbols,
the traces that carry historical stigmas and that the artist challenges.
However, South African women are not totally freed from the restrictions
of the past, the present, and the future - even though they have shed the
Voortrekker dress, the kappie (bonnet) and the apron remain. The artist
opens up some historical stigmas in his portrayal of women. His women
represent and interact with history and tradition but at the same time
challenge it. His view is not an oversimplistic view of life in a new
millenium and of life in a "democratic" South Africa.
I connect these arguments with Anne Scales's feminist critique on the
legal principle of objective reality." She recalls the myth of Perseus to
illustrate how patriarchy informs rationality, objectivity and ultimately the
dominant understanding of justice. Perseus was able to slay the female
monster Medusa only with the help of Athena. It is important to remember
here that Medusa illustrated the image of a free woman. Athena, however,
was the patriarchal stereotype of women. 2
48. See supra text accompanying note 39.
49. FIN. MAIL, Oct. 1999, at 15.
50. Id.
51. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of FeministJurisprudence:An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373

(1986).
52. Id. at 1379.
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A further contention is one against incorporationism. Scales describes
incorporationism as a process through which contradictions are repressed
and through which marginal voices are made to believe that they have a
place in the existing system. Incorporationism presumes that white male
supremacy is simply a random collection of irrationalities - that

discrimination, for example, is simply a legal mistake. This could also be
linked to South African legal reform and transformation.
Some South African legal scholars regard apartheid, for example, as a
political and legal mistake that can be fixed via a new and democratic legal
and political order without investigating deeper and more nuanced
connections between law and modernity as such and power, racism,
sexism, and so on.53 We see this in arguments in favor of the common law
as a system that stayed pure and untouched by the political conservatism
of apartheid judges. This has the effect that many scholars would argue for
constitutional minimalism or avoidance and reliance on common law
principles instead of using the constitution.
Women, black and white, as well as men, who resist to be merely
incorporated by current systems, could face acts of discrimination and
exclusion. As said in the introduction, a question that arises here is on
what grounds this kind of discrimination or exclusion could be based. To

prefer the traditional image of the blindfolded justitia to the black seeing
justitia, or van Wouw's submissive and shy maiden to Taylor's confident
and armed women could be regarded as a gender preference, a preference
that can easily lead to unfair discrimination.
Although the concept of gender has its limits, I find it a helpful way of
explaining and exposing the type of discrimination where neither sex, race,
class or even culture can fully capture the extent of the discrimination. The
method of intersectionality as developed by Critical Race Feminists, is of
course much more insightful to how the combination/intersection of a
person's race, class and sex/gender results in acts of discrimination or
exclusion.5 4 However, I would like to see an even further concern with
particularity that could be opened by turning to gender. Gender is
traditionally described as a cultural construction and a gender difference
as a culturally constructed difference. My concern here is the
53. See, e.g., DAVID DYZENHAUS, TRUTH, RECONCILIATION AND THE APARTHEID LEGAL

ORDER (1998). For a critical perspective on apartheid, see Robert Bernasconi, Politics Beyond
Humanism: Mandelaand the Struggle againstApartheid, in WORKING THROUGH DERRIDA 94-119
(Gary B. Madison ed., 1993); Jacques Derrida, Racism's Last Word, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 290-99
(1985); Jacques Derrida, The Laws ofReflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration, in FOR NELSON
MANDELA 13-42 (Jacques Derrida & Mustapha Tlili eds., 1987).
54. See, e.g., Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe intersection Between Race andSex:
A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscriminationDoctrine, 139 FEMINIST THEORY & ANTIRACIST
POL. 139-67 (1989).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol16/iss3/9

14

20041

"MEETING THE WORLD HALFWAY -

THE LIMITS OF LEGAL TRANSFORMATION

van Marle: "Meeting the World Halfway"—The Limits of Legal Transformation

665

discrimination or exclusion that occurs when one does not live up to the

expected or stereotyped gender difference. Again we are faced with the
limits of the law to be able to include such particularity in its reasonable
attempts of reconstruction and transformation as well as law's paradox.

[T]he particular can be meaningfully invoked but .. . cannot be
addressed in legal judgment. . . . the logic of legal judgment is
exclusionary in having substituted and entrenched "particular"
reasons at a level where its operation can no longer address them.
The reason for this..., is that the complexity of "the particular"has
(always -)already been reduced in law.55

V. END REMARKS
To return to the three related moments: the law and legal
transformation can but only be a meeting of the world halfway; to follow
a narrow and formalist interpretation of designated group will not only be
defeating the substantive aim of the South African transformation, but it
might be a mere continuation of white male power and patriarchy. My call

is for all South African women, black and white, to resist being coerced as
Athenas, blindfolded Justitias and shy maidens and to face each other, the

past, present and future of our society. To defy rigid and fixed identities
forced upon us and to embrace Kentridge's celebration of doubt, against
reason.

55. Christodoulidis, supra note 14, at 237.
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